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How Scholarship Programs  
Impact Students and the Culture of 
Law School
Jerome Organ
Law schools design their scholarship assistance programs in a variety of 
ways depending upon the mix of students they would like to attract.1 This 
article focuses on one specific aspect of scholarship programs—“renewability.” 
With respect to renewability, law school scholarship programs generally fall 
into two broad categories.2 First, there is the “competitive” category in which 
students receiving scholarship assistance as first-year students will retain their 
scholarships only if they perform to a certain level, e.g., in the top one-quarter 
or top one-third of the first-year class. Second, there is the “non-competitive” 
1. Scholarship programs might be used not only to attract bright, talented students, but also 
to attract a diverse student body or a student body with significant leadership skills or with 
a significant commitment to public service. Depending upon the precise mix of students a 
school desires to attract, it might “invest” its scholarship resources differently than another 
school. For purposes of this article, however, I am assuming the two hypothetical law 
schools I discuss below are pursuing the same general balance or mix of students, except 
that they are trying to use scholarship assistance to generate the “best” possible class in 
terms of objective criteria —LSAT and undergraduate GPA. Notably, for purposes of this 
article’s discussion of scholarship programs, the emphasis will be on merit-based scholarship 
programs rather than on need-based scholarship programs. 
2. In addition to the competitive and non-competitive scholarship models described in this 
article, there are a handful of schools that fall into one of two other categories—schools 
that do not offer merit scholarships at all but offer only need-based aid, see, e.g., Harvard, 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/current/sfs/index.html, and Yale, http://www.law.yale.edu/
admissions/Costs&FinancialAid.htm, and schools that offer only one-year scholarships and 
expressly require students to reapply to be considered for a scholarship in their second year 
or third year, see, e.g., Maine, http://mainelaw.maine.edu/admissions/scholarships.html, and 
Creighton, http://www.creighton.edu/law/admissions/financinglawschool/scholarships/
index.php. For purposes of this article, schools with one-year scholarships that require 
reapplication are included within the set of “competitive” law schools because first-year 
students will be competing to position themselves to be awarded scholarships as second-
year students.
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category in which students receiving scholarship assistance as first-year 
students will retain their scholarships provided they remain in good academic 
standing. 
This article attempts to do three different things. First, the article attempts 
to describe how different scholarship models might impact recruiting by 
analyzing how two “identical” law schools embracing these two different 
approaches to scholarships likely would yield first-year classes with different 
compositions. Second, the article describes what law schools actually do in 
terms of scholarship programs, explains why law schools might embrace 
different scholarship models, and explores how scholarship programs with 
different renewal criteria likely would impact the well-being of law students 
and the competitive environment of the two law schools. Third, this article 
describes best practices and makes recommendations regarding appropriate 
disclosure of information regarding scholarship programs.
Comparison of the Competitive and  
Non-Competitive Scholarship Renewal Models 
This article begins by describing the ways in which the two hypothetical 
law schools discussed below—the Non-Competitive Law School and the 
Competitive Law School—should be seen as being “identical” with respect to 
applicant pool and yield data. The following section sets out the assumptions 
operational for both law schools regarding the applicant pool and the 
anticipated yield within the various quartiles of the applicant pool particularly 
in response to scholarship offers. The article then looks at how the two 
different models of scholarship programs, when intersecting with the baseline 
assumptions operational for both schools, would result in first year classes 
with different compositions. 
Assumptions for Comparison of Models 
Assume that Non-Competitive Law School and Competitive Law School 
both are urban, private law schools, and assume further that in the U.S. News & 
World Report rankings both schools are third-tier schools. In addition, assume 
that neither has a part-time program and that both have a student body of 600 
students (200 students in each class) with a tuition cost of $30,000 per year.3 
This means total potential annual tuition revenue is $18,000,000. The budget 
3. In reality, the size of the student body at most schools changes from first year to second year 
to third year as schools experience some attrition —students who transfer to another school, 
see Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Tragedy of the Student Commons: Law Student Transfers and 
Legal Education, 60 J. Legal Educ. 616 (2011)—or students who withdraw or take a leave of 
absence. In addition, law school tuition generally has increased from year to year. See infra 
note 33 and accompanying text.
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of each law school allows it to invest 20 percent of its revenue on scholarship 
assistance for its students. So in any given year, the schools have $3,600,000 in 
scholarship assistance available. 
Each school has a similar pool of applicants—1,500 applicants, of whom 150 
have an LSAT of 160 or above, 250 have an LSAT of 158 or 159, 300 have an 
LSAT of 156 or 157, and the final 800 have an LSAT at or below 155.4 
Each school has comparable yield data. In the absence of scholarship 
assistance, each school yields 10 percent of applicants with LSAT scores at or 
above 160, 15 percent of applicants with LSAT scores of 158 or 159, 20 percent 
of applicants with LSAT scores of 156 or 157, and 30 percent of applicants with 
LSAT scores of 155 or less. With scholarship assistance each school also has 
comparable yields.5 Thus, when each school offers a scholarship to a student 
at or above an LSAT score of 160, it anticipates a yield of 40 percent on full 
scholarships,6 and a yield of 30 percent on one-half scholarships. When each 
school offers a scholarship to a student with an LSAT score of 158 or 159, it 
anticipates a yield of 40 percent on one-half scholarships, and 30 percent when 
it offers a one-quarter scholarship. With respect to those with LSAT scores of 
156 or 157, to which each school only offers one-quarter scholarships, if any 
scholarship at all, it anticipates a yield of 40 percent.7 
4. While U.S. News & World Report tracks LSAT and undergraduate GPA, this article will 
focus solely on LSAT, for purposes of simplifying the examples.
5. One might critique the assumption that the schools have comparable yields because the 
expected value of a scholarship at the noncompetitive school over three years is higher than 
the expected value of the same level of scholarship at the competitive school, given that 
the probability of renewing the scholarship in the second and third years is lower at the 
competitive school. However, there is evidence that admitted students treat the value of 
these scholarships as the same, likely due to exaggerated optimism and lack of information 
on renewal rates. See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
6. For purposes of this analytical comparison, I am going to assume that the schools offer 
full scholarships only to students with LSAT scores of 160 or above while also offering 
half scholarships to some of these students. I appreciate that this may be an unrealistic 
assumption for a variety of reasons, and that a school might have a better yield with offers 
of full scholarships that it makes to students with LSAT scores less than 160 (and that there 
might be a number of reasons to offer full scholarships to students with lower LSAT scores). 
7. Again, for purposes of this analytical comparison, I am going to assume that the schools do 
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Common Yield Assumptions for Non-Competitive  
Law School and Competitive Law School 












>160 150 150 40 30 NA 10
158–159 250 220 NA 40 30 15
156–157 300 240 NA NA 40 20
< 155 800 TBD NA NA NA 30
TOTAL 1500
Finally, assume that neither school is interested in distributing scholarship 
money evenly among all students.8 Rather, each of the two schools will 
distribute scholarship assistance across their pools of applicants in an effort 
to get the pool of students with the highest median LSAT and GPA, because 
these are two of the key reference points in the U.S. News & World Report’s 
rankings system.9 
not offer one-quarter scholarships to students with LSAT scores less than 156, recognizing 
that a school might have a better yield with offers of one-quarter scholarships that it makes 
to students with LSAT scores less than 156.
8. Neither law school will find it advantageous to give out uniform scholarship amounts 
to all students it admits from its pool of applicants because this is likely to result in a 
disproportionate yield among students at the bottom of the qualifications continuum.
9. Twenty-five percent of U.S. News & World Report rankings are attributable to LSAT (12.5 
percent), GPA (10 percent), and acceptance rate (the percentage of applications rejected, 2.5 
percent). The strong emphasis on rankings leads non-elite law schools to conduct expensive 
programs to boost these metrics, in order to boost rankings. William D. Henderson & 
Andrew P. Morriss, Student Quality as Measured by LSAT Scores: Migration Patterns in 
the U.S. News Rankings, 81 Ind. L.J. 163, 165–166 (2006). The impact of these metrics is 
magnified to the extent that bar passage rate is correlated at all with the objective criteria, 
given that bar passage rate accounts for 2 percent of U.S. News rank. U.S. News & World 
Report, Law School Rankings Methodology, available at http://www.usnews.com/articles/
education/best-law-schools/2009/04/22/law-school-rankings-methodology.html. Notably, 
LSAT and law school GPA are the two most significant factors that have been found to 
affect bar passage. Linda F. Wightman, LSAC National Longitudinal Bar Passage Study (L. 
Sch. Admis. Council Research Rpt. Series 1998), available at http://www.unc.edu/edp/pdf/
NLBPS.pdf. Bar passage affects employability, and employment rates for graduates account 
for 18 percent of the U.S. News rank, reinforcing the importance of the LSAT score. Andrew 
P. Morriss & William D. Henderson, Measuring Outcomes: Post-Graduation Measures of 
Success in the U.S. News & World Report Law School Rankings, 83 Ind. L.J. 791, 808 
(2008). 
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Nonetheless, each school must decide how to distribute scholarship 
assistance among the three classes of students—first-year students, second-year 
students and third-year students—and each does it in a very different way.
Description of the Non-Competitive Law School Scholarship Model 
The Non-Competitive Law School decides to offer scholarship assistance 
on a non-competitive renewal basis. It appreciates that it is making a three-
year investment in each student who receives scholarship assistance because 
it realizes there is little likelihood of a student performing so poorly as to 
no longer be in good academic standing. Accordingly, it has to divide its 
$3,600,000 in scholarship assistance over three classes of students and can 
only offer $1,200,000 in scholarship assistance to incoming first-year students 
(who, it is assumed, will receive $1,200,000 in scholarship assistance as second-
year students and third-year students as well). 
As noted above, the Non-Competitive Law School and the Competitive 
Law School each hope and want to get as many students at the top of the 
applicant pool while also trying to assure that the middle and bottom of its 
entering class also is as competitive as possible. To do this, each will need 
to distribute scholarship assistance fairly widely across the profile of entering 
students (without simply giving every student the average award of $6,000). 
For example, the Non-Competitive Law School could offer 20 students a 
full scholarship (20 x $30,000 = $600,000); it could offer 20 students a one-half 
scholarship (20 x $15,000 = $300,000); and it could offer 40 students a one-
quarter scholarship (40 x $7,500 = $300,000). This would result in scholarship 
assistance of $1,200,000 spread over eighty students (at an average scholarship 
of $15,000, rather than simply having 40 students receive full scholarships of 
$30,000 each). 
If its yield is 40 percent among full scholarship recipients with LSATs at 
or above 160, it would need to offer 50 full scholarships to get 20 students 
enrolled with full scholarships. If it expected a 30 percent yield on one-half 
scholarships to applicants with LSATs at or above 160, it might offer 67 more 
applicants one-half scholarships and get 20 of them to enroll. That would 
leave about 33 applicants with LSATs at or above 160. If it admits 30 of 
them without scholarship and yields 10 percent, it would end up with 3 more 
students at or above 160 (for a total of 43).10 With $900,000 committed to 
scholarships, it would still have $300,000 in scholarship assistance available 
for other students. 
10. Please note that the assumption that schools will not admit all students with LSATs at or 
above 160 and will admit only 80 percent of the applicants with LSAT scores of 156–159 is 
based on the premise that some percentage of applicants will have character and fitness 
problems or will have really low GPAs that may make schools reluctant to admit them in 
spite of their very respectable LSAT scores. 
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With a yield of 30 percent on one-quarter scholarships for applicants with 
LSAT scores of 158 or 159, it could offer one-quarter scholarships to 133 of 
the applicants with LSATs of 158 or 159 and expect to yield 40 of them. If it 
admits the 67 additional applicants it is inclined to admit with LSATs of 158 
or 159 without scholarship and has a yield of 15 percent on that population, 
that would be another 10 students, giving it 50 students with LSATs of 158 
or 159 (and a total of 93 students with an LSAT of 158 or better). Among 
the 300 applicants with LSATs of 156 or 157, if it admits 240 of them without 
scholarship and expects a yield of 20 percent, it can expect a yield of forty-
eight students, giving it 141 students with LSATs at or above 156. That would 
leave 59 spots in its class. If it chose to admit 197 of the applicants with LSATs 
at or below 155, with an expected yield of 30 percent, it would have 59 more 
students and would have a full class of 200 with an expected LSAT quartile 
break of 159/157/155. It would also have gotten this class by admitting 784 
students, 52.3 percent of the 1500 applicants.11
11. With 43 students at 160 or better and 50 students at 158 or 159, it is very likely that 7 or more 
students will have an LSAT of 159, making the 25 percent break 159. With 43 additional 
students at 158 or 159, and 48 students at 156 or 157, it is very likely that 7 or more students 
will have an LSAT of 157, making the median 157. With 41 students left at 156 or 157, and 59 
students at or below 155, it is very likely that 9 or more students will have an LSAT of 155, 
making the 75 percent break 155. 
 Some might question why the Non-Competitive Law School would not give all scholarship 
assistance to students at the top of the LSAT profile. The reason is that this is not likely to 
yield as strong a class overall. With an anticipated yield of 40 percent on students with an 
LSAT at or above 160 who receive a full scholarship, the school might expect to have a great 
top quartile using such a system, but without any scholarship assistance beyond that, the 
school would experience a decreased yield through the remainder of its applicant pool, such 
that the median and the bottom quartile will be lower than what might be possible with a 
more diverse scholarship program. 
 For example, Non-Competitive Law School could offer 100 of its top applicants full 
scholarships with the expectation that it would yield 40 students with LSATs at or above 
160. But, it would then have no further scholarship funds to attract students. Using the 
statistical profiles described above, it would have another 50 applicants at or above an LSAT 
of 160, of which it could expect to yield 10 percent or 5, giving it 45 students with an LSAT 
at or above 160. Then, if it chooses to admit 200 of the 250 applicants with an LSAT of 158 
or 159, and yields 15 percent of those admits, it would yield 30 students with LSAT scores of 
158 or 159, and have 75 students in its first year class with LSAT scores of 158 or better. With 
respect to the 300 applicants with an LSAT of 156 or 157, if it chooses to admit 240 applicants 
with a yield of 20 percent, it could expect 48 students, giving it 123 students with LSATs at or 
above 156. That would leave it about 77 spots in its entering class of 200. With an expected 
yield of 30 percent among those with LSAT scores at or below 155, it would want to admit 
about 257 applicants (of the 800 that applied in that range) to yield 77. 
 Its class profile also would likely be 159/156/154. With only 45 students at or above an LSAT 
of 160, and 25 additional students at 158 or 159, it would need 25 of the 48 students with an 
LSAT of 156 or 157 to be at 157 to hold a median of 157. As 25 is more than half of 48, it is 
slightly more likely that 156 will be the median. That would leave 23 students with an LSAT 
of 156. Of the 77 students at 155 or below, it is unlikely that 27 of them will have an LSAT of 
155, so the 25th percentile is likely to be 154.
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The Non-Competitive Law School Scholarship Program 
LSAT Admits Yield 
percent
Matrics Cost Total 
Matrics
>160 50 Full Sch 40 20 $600,000
67 Half Sch 30 20 $300,000
30 None 10 3 0
Total 43 $900,000
158-159  133 Qtr Sch 30 40 $300,000
67 None 15 10 0
Total 50 $300,000 93
156-157 240 20 48 0 141
<155 197 30 59 0 200
TOTAL 784 $1,200,000
For the Non-Competitive Law School—80 of the 200 students receive 
scholarship assistance and are anticipated to keep it for their second year and 
third year because the Non-Competitive Law School has a non-competitive 
renewal policy. That means that $3.6 million is divided evenly between first-
year students, second-year students, and third-year students, with $1.2 million 
per each set of students and a total of 240 students (out of 600) on scholarship. 
Description of the Competitive Law School Scholarship Model 
The Competitive Law School takes a different approach to scholarships. 
Scholarships are renewed at the Competitive Law School only if a student’s 
GPA at the end of the first year places her in the top one-third of the class. The 
Competitive Law School appreciates that it is making a three-year investment 
of scholarship assistance in some of its students, but that it is making only a 
one-year investment of scholarship assistance in other students who will not 
have their scholarships renewed because they failed to perform in the top one-
third of the first-year class. 
The Competitive Law School has historical performance data suggesting 
that over time, 80 percent of students in the top one-third at the end of the first 
year are students on scholarship (roughly 54 of the 67 students in the top-third 
of the class at the end of the first year were students with scholarship assistance 
who were eligible for renewal while the other 13 were students who had not 
received scholarship assistance and had outperformed their objective criteria). 
If we assume that 20 of the 54 have full scholarships (20 x $30,000 = $600,000), 
while 18 have one-half scholarships (18 x $15,000 = $270,000) and 16 have one-
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quarter scholarships (16 x $7,500 = $120,000),12 then the “renewed” scholarship 
total would be $990,000, and the second-year and third-year scholarship totals 
combined would be $1,980,000, leaving $1,620,000 for first-year scholarships. 
Notably, this means a significant number of the initial scholarship recipients 
no longer have scholarships as second-year and third-year students. 
Like the Non-Competitive Law School, the Competitive Law School 
is unlikely to offer each of the 200 first-year students $8,100 in scholarship. 
Because the Competitive Law School has $1,620,000 in scholarship assistance 
for first-year students, however, as compared to the $1,200,000 in scholarship 
assistance available at the Non-Competitive Law School, the Competitive 
Law School can offer larger scholarships to more applicants (although for 
these purposes, we will assume that the Competitive Law School distributes 
similar percentages of scholarship assistance among similar populations of 
applicants). 
For example, the Competitive Law School could offer 28 students a full 
scholarship (28 x $30,000 = $840,000); it could offer 32 students a one-half 
scholarship (32 x $15,000 = $480,000); and it could offer 40 students a one-
quarter scholarship (40 x $7,500 = $300,000). This would result in total first-
year scholarship assistance of $1,620,000, spread over 100 first-year students. 
How might this change the profile of the entering class for the Competitive 
Law School as compared to the Non-Competitive Law School? Well, as noted 
above, we are going to assume similar yield statistics for the Competitive 
Law School as for the Non-Competitive Law School. If its yield is 40 percent 
among full scholarship recipients with LSATs at or above 160, it would need to 
offer 70 full scholarships to yield 28 full scholarship students. If its yield is 30 
percent on one-half scholarship recipients with LSATs at or above 160, it could 
offer one-half scholarships to seventy of the remaining applicants with LSATs 
at or above 160 and expect to yield 21 students. That would leave 10 applicants 
with an LSAT of 160. If it were to admit 7 of them without scholarship and 
yield 10 percent it likely would end up with 1 additional student for a total of 
50 students with an LSAT at or above 160. With an expenditure of $1,155,000 
in scholarship assistance for these 50 students, it would still have $465,000 in 
scholarship assistance for other students.
With a yield of 40 percent among those with an LSAT of 158 or 159 who 
receive a one-half scholarship, it could offer 28 one-half scholarships and expect 
to yield 11 students. With a yield of 30 percent among those with an LSAT of 
158 or 159 who receive a one-quarter scholarship, it could offer 134 one-quarter 
12. This distribution of renewed scholarships is premised on a differential renewal rate based 
on LSAT scores, such that full scholarship recipients renew at a higher rate than one-
half scholarship recipients and so on. This is consistent with LSAC data regarding the 
LSAT as a predictor of first-year grades. See L. Wightman, Beyond FYA: Analysis of the 
Utility of LSAT Scores and UGPA for Predicting Academic Success in Law School (Non-
Competitive Law School Admission Council Report 99–05 2000), available at http://www.
lsac.org/LSACResources/Research/RR/RR-99-05.pdf.
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scholarships and expect to yield 40 students. These 51 additional students 
receiving scholarship assistance would exhaust the balance of the $465,000 in 
scholarship assistance. This would leave 38 applicants in the 158–159 range that 
the Competitive Law School would be inclined to admit. If it admitted them 
without scholarship assistance, the Competitive Law School could anticipate a 
yield of 15 percent or roughly 6 students. So the Competitive Law School could 
expect 57 students with an LSAT of 158–159 (11 half-scholarship recipients, 
40 quarter-scholarship recipients and 6 students without scholarship). This 
would give the Competitive Law School 107 students with an LSAT of 158 or 
better and would suggest that the Competitive Law School would have a 75th 
percentile LSAT of 160 and a median of 158 (compared to a 159/157 split for the 
Non-Competitive Law School reflected in the model above).
With respect to the students in the 156-157 range, the Competitive Law 
School would be comparable to the model reflected above with respect to the 
Non-Competitive Law School. The Competitive Law School would probably 
be admitting 240 of the 300 applicants without scholarship, for which it could 
expect a yield of 20 percent. This would generate an expected yield of 48 
students, giving it a class of 155, with a likely 25th percentile of 156. With a 
yield of 30 percent on applicants with LSATs of 155 or lower, to get the final 
45 students for the class, the Competitive Law School would need to admit 
roughly 150 applicants. Thus, the Competitive Law School easily could find 
itself with an LSAT quartile break of 160/158/156—or one full point better 
on all 3 quartiles for LSAT. Moreover, the Competitive Law School might 
expect to do this while admitting only 740 applicants (less than 50 percent 
of applicants and roughly 5 percent fewer admitted applicants than the Non-
Competitive Law School). 
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The Competitive Law School Scholarship Program 
LSAT Admits Yield Matrics Cost Total 
Matrics
>160 70 Full Sch 40 percent 28 $840,000
70 Half Sch 30 percent 21 $315,000
10 None 10 percent 1
Total 50 $1,155,000
158-159 28 Half Sch 40 percent 11 $165,000
134 Qtr. 30 percent 40 $300,000
38 None 15 percent 6 0
Total 57 $465,000 107
156-157 240 20 percent 48 0 155
<155 150 30 percent 45 0 200
TOTAL 740 $1,620,000
For the Competitive Law School, 100 of the 200 first-year students receive 
scholarship assistance, but only fifty-four of the students are anticipated to 
keep their scholarships as second-year and third-year students (if we assume 
that nearly 80 percent of the students in the top one-third are scholarship 
recipients (fifty-four of sixty-seven)).13 Notably, this also means forty-six of 
13. This renewal rate of 54 percent is actually higher than at least one law school which indicated 
in an email on the Admit-L Listserve that it generally renews about 45 percent of first-year 
merit scholarships (email on file with the author). In addition, a recent New York Times 
article indicated that Golden Gate’s renewal rate on merit scholarships has tended to be 
around 50–55 percent—roughly 160 incoming students—60 percent of the incoming class 
of roughly 270—receive scholarships, but generally speaking no more than 30 percent—or 
roughly 80 students—earn the 3.0 GPA needed to maintain the scholarship. David Segal, 
How Law Students Lose the Grant Game and How Law Schools Win, N.Y. Times, May 
1, 2011, Bus. Day 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/01/business/law-school-
grants.html?_r=1&ref=davidsegal. Only three of the 195 law schools included in this analysis 
publish renewal data on their websites. Phoenix Law School notes that 40 percent of its 
first-year students maintain the required GPA of 3.0, but only 30 percent of the scholarship 
recipients will renew their scholarships. http://www.phoenixlaw.edu/admissions/default.
asp?PageID=17. Rutgers-Newark notes that “more than 80 percent of our merit scholarship 
recipients retain them for their entire law school career.” http://law.newark.rutgers.edu/
admissions-financial-aid/paying-law-school-faqs. St. John’s also posts renewal rates noting 
that its “[a]verage scholarship retention rate from 2009-2010 [was] 60.2 percent.” http://
www.stjohns.edu/academics/graduate/law/prospective/admissions/tuition.stj. One other 
school, the University of Tulsa School of Law, reported information from which a renewal 
rate could be calculated as its webpage noted that 64 percent of first years and 49 percent 
of its students overall are on scholarship. http://www.utulsa.edu/academics/colleges/
college-of-law/Law%20Admission%20and%20Financial%20Aid/Tuition%20and%20
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the initial scholarship recipients no longer have scholarships as second-year 
and third-year students. All total, 208 students (out of 600) would be on 
scholarship—100 first-year students, fifty-four second-year students and fifty-
four third-year students. 
What are the differences in the scholarship renewal models of the 
Competitive Law School and the Non-Competitive Law School? Using 
the scholarship distribution profiles reflected above, the Competitive Law 
School is able to offer more generous scholarships to more first-year students. 
The Competitive Law School also is able to attract a first-year class with a 
slightly better LSAT profile. But the Non-Competitive Law School offers 
scholarships to more second-year and third-year students. While the eighty 
first-year students who received scholarship assistance at the Non-Competitive 
Law School can expect to keep their scholarships (because they should expect 
to remain in good academic standing), 46 of the 100 first-year students who 
received scholarship assistance at the Competitive Law School should expect 
to lose their scholarships.
What Do Law Schools Actually Do? 
Based on a review of publicly available information regarding law schools 
and their scholarship programs, this article classifies scholarship programs at 
160 law schools.14 Of these 160 law schools, it appears that 122—over 75 percent 
—have some type of “competitive” scholarship program while only thirty-
one—fewer than 20 percent—have a “non-competitive” scholarship program.15 
Notably, only four of these 160 schools had any information posted on their 
webpages indicating renewal rates on scholarships.16
Financial%20Aid/Scholarships.aspx. This means only 42 percent or so of its second-year 
and third-year students are on scholarship, so roughly 66 percent of first-year scholarships 
are renewed. 
14. The primary sources of data for this article are the NAPLA-SAPLA Book of Lists, 2009, 
the ABA-LSAC Official Guide to ABA-Approved Law Schools, 88–857 (2009 Ed.), and law 
school webpages. 
15. For the 160 law schools on which I could find meaningful information, 122 have competitive 
renewal programs (Appendix A) and 31 have non-competitive renewal programs (Appendix 
B) while seven award only need-based aid. There was insufficient information to classify 
the remaining thirty-five law schools on which I tried to gather information. Notably, 
Appendix A includes schools that reported variable conditions on scholarship renewal and 
also includes those law schools that reported that scholarships for entering students were 
only one-year scholarships (because scholarships for second-year and third-year students 
were awarded based on law school GPA or class rank). Appendix C includes the seven law 
schools with need-based programs along with the thirty-five schools for which it was not 
possible to find data sufficient to classify the school. 
16. See supra note 13.
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Why Might Law Schools Choose One Model or the Other? 
Looking at the charts above, one can quickly grasp why Competitive 
Law Schools might choose the competitive model for scholarship assistance 
as opposed to the non-competitive model for scholarship assistance. The 
Competitive Law School has the possibility of attracting a first-year student 
population with higher objective criteria, which can correspond to an 
improvement in its ranking in the U.S. News & World Report.17 In one sense, 
this could be viewed simply as another way to “game” the rankings.18 
17. Compare 160/158/156 with 159/157/155 in rankings. Recruiting a first-year class with the 
highest possible LSAT profile clearly is a motivation for some schools. In a recent email 
exchange on the Admit-L Listserv, one of the admissions representatives noted the 
representative’s school might increase merit scholarships to top applicants while reducing 
scholarships to those around the school’s median (consistent with the formula used for the 
two hypothetical schools in this article) and that the school would be trying to make better 
offers “to those that ‘truly help our numbers.’” Email on file with the author.
 Notably, recruiting a class with the highest possible LSAT profile can work at cross-purposes 
with recruiting a diverse class of students, another goal for many law schools. LSAT scores 
vary across different racial and ethnic populations and Caucasian test takers earn higher 
scores on the test than any other ethnic group. Asian test takers outperform Caucasians on 
the Analytical Reasoning section, but Caucasians outperform all ethnic groups in every other 
section. African-Americans score the lowest, both on the test as a whole and on individual 
sections. Linda F. Wightman & David G. Muller, Comparison of LSAT Performance 
Among Selected Subgroups, LSAC Statistical Rpt. 90–1 (1990), available at http://www.lsac.
org/LSACResources/Research/SR/SR-90-01.pdf. at 29. Given that law schools generally 
have a finite amount to invest in scholarship assistance, a decision to invest scholarship 
resources in “diversity” scholarships—designed to attract a racially and ethnically diverse 
student body—or “leadership” or “service” scholarships— designed to attract students who 
bring unique leadership skills or a significant passion for public service—may come at the 
expense of scholarship assistance available to attract a student body reflecting the highest 
possible LSAT scores or GPAs. While some candidates may combine attributes and make 
for a particularly worthwhile scholarship investment, others may offer only one attribute. 
For purposes of this article, these “variations” are not of consequence because this article 
assumes the two schools discussed above have the same perspectives on using scholarships 
for diversity, leadership or service.
18. Law school commentators have noted one method by which law schools “game” the ranking 
system—by shifting students from full-time status to part-time status (because up until 
recently, U.S. News & World Report only counted the objective criteria of full-time first-
year students in its rankings profile). Henderson & Morriss, supra note 9, at 181; see http://
lawprofessors.typepad.com/legal_profession/2008/08/posted-by-jeff.html (blog posting 
describing gaming at one law school with a significant decrease in full-time enrollment and a 
significant increase in part-time enrollment and an accompanying improvement in objective 
criteria that resulted in the school moving into the second tier). Notably, for the rankings 
dataset released in April 2009, U.S. News & World Report used the complete first-year 
class profile, including full-time students and part-time students—thus eliminating one way 
of “gaming” the system. DealBreaker, Above the Law, April 27, 2009, available at http://
abovethelaw.com/2009/04/open_thread_2010_us_news_law_s_1.php (noting that the 
George Washington University Law School ranking fell from 20 to 28 at least partly because 
of the addition of the part-time students to the student profile). 
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In addition, it is conceivable that a law school also may choose to embrace 
a “competitive” scholarship model to free up “misdirected” scholarship 
assistance so that financial assistance is available to retain rising second-year 
students who outperformed their objective criteria profile (and finished in the 
top one-quarter or top one-third of their class). A number of schools suffer 
modest hemorrhaging of some students in the top-half or top-third of their 
class who choose to transfer to schools ranked higher by the U.S. News & World 
Report so that they can get their degree from the more highly ranked institution, 
sometimes at less cost (if they do not have scholarship assistance and if they are 
transferring from a private law school to a public law school).19 These students 
might be persuaded to remain at their original school if they can benefit from 
carrying a reduced financial burden as a second-year and third-year student. 
Unless a school has dedicated some portion of its finite pool of resources for 
scholarship assistance to second-year and third-year students, however, the 
only way to fund this “upper-level assistance” is to cannibalize scholarships 
originally given to other first-year students (who have not performed as well) 
and who have already “served their purpose” of helping enhance the objective 
criteria profile of the entering class.20 
19. Rensberger, supra note 3 (discussing trends in transfers among law schools). Commentators 
have noted that transfers present another approach to “gaming” the ranking system. Some 
schools have reduced the size of their first-year class (making it easier to maintain higher 
objective criteria across a smaller pool of students), and have made up for the lost revenue 
by aggressively recruiting transfer students to boost second-year and third-year enrollment. 
See Henderson & Morriss, supra note 9, at n. 60 and accompanying text. See also Leslie 
A. Gordon, Transfers Bolster Elite Schools, ABA Journal (Dec. 2008), available at http://
www.abajournal.com/magazine/transfers_bolster_elite_schools/. At this point, however, 
the U.S. News & World Report has not done anything to integrate the objective criteria 
associated with transfer students in a law school’s student profile to negate this “gaming” 
technique.
20. Notably, neither of the hypothetical law schools has set aside funds to retain rising second-
year students. To fund such “new” scholarships for second-year students, the available pool 
of scholarship money for first-year students would have to be reduced or the number of 
renewed scholarships would have to be reduced further so that some of the available second-
year scholarship assistance could go to students who had not received scholarship assistance 
as first-year students (rather than only going to renewal candidates). If a school opts for the 
latter option, the renewal rate would be even lower than estimated above. 
 In addition, embracing the competitive model for scholarships partly for the purpose of 
promoting retention can be a double-edged sword. While it might free up some resources 
to try to retain students considering transferring, it also may encourage those students who 
did not have their scholarships renewed to consider transferring. Those students whose 
scholarships are not renewed may conclude that if they have to pay the full freight for 
tuition, they may be better off doing so at a more highly ranked law school or at a less 
expensive law school. Therefore, it is hard to say whether this “cannibalizing” approach to 
competitive scholarship programs generates a positive net result for the school. The school 
would need to assess whether it prevented more transfers than it facilitated. 
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By contrast, law schools that choose the “non-competitive” scholarship 
model are presumably making a conscious choice not to get too caught up in 
the “rankings” game. Instead, they tell their first-year scholarship recipients 
that they will keep their scholarships so long as they remain in good academic 
standing and thereby communicate to their first-year scholarship recipients 
that they truly are valued for the attributes and experiences they bring to 
the community, not simply for their LSAT score or their first-year academic 
performance. 
How Might These Scholarship Models  
Impact Students and Shape the Culture of Law Schools? 
A law school’s choice to pursue the competitive approach to scholarship 
renewal comes with a cost—there is no “free lunch.” In this section, I compare 
the impact of scholarship programs on law students and law school culture in 
three contexts—financial stress, competitiveness, and individual value.
Financial Stress
For students at Non-Competitive Law Schools, the financial aspect of the 
decision to attend law school operates as a one-time decision that coincides 
with the decision to attend the Non-Competitive Law School. Each student 
who decides to attend the Non-Competitive Law School knows what he or she 
can expect to spend on tuition over the three years. There are no “surprises” at 
the Non-Competitive Law School. Indeed, there is little reason for students at 
the Non-Competitive Law School to think much about their scholarships or 
their absence of a scholarship.21
With respect to the Competitive Law School, based on the scholarship 
distribution profile reflected above, the 100 first-year students who did not 
receive scholarship assistance will have no uncertainty about the cost of their 
legal education—they will incur the full $90,000 in tuition over the three 
years of law school.22 Of the other 100 students who did receive scholarship 
21. Note that there might be some students without scholarships as first-years who perform very 
well and, even though they may have no expectation about obtaining scholarship assistance, 
may inquire about whether they can get some scholarships as rising second-year students or 
rising third-year students. Sometimes these students will consider transferring (and may be 
encouraged to consider transferring by schools that have lowered the size of their first year 
class to raise their LSAT and GPA profiles and increased the number of transfers they take 
to make up lost revenue). See supra note 19. 
22. Notably, while non-scholarship students have no uncertainty about the financial aspects 
of the cost of their legal education, the reality is that those students paying full tuition—
generally those with lower objective criteria (LSAT and UGPA), effectively subsidize the 
legal education of those with higher scores, as most scholarship programs are not funded by 
endowments but are funded by tuition discounting—by tuition-paying students. Daniel J. 
Morrissey, Saving Legal Education, 56 J. Legal Educ. 254, 269 (2006). In our hypotheticals, 
the tuition could have been reduced to $24,000 (from $30,000) if each school had no 
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assistance as first-year students, however, forty-six students (nearly one-quarter 
of the overall first-year class of 200) will have to confront a changed financial 
circumstance at the end of their first-year of law school. And because none of 
the 100 first-year scholarship recipients can be sure of how they will end the 
first-year in class rank, the reality is that all 100 scholarship recipients (half of 
the first-year class) will need to be worried about the possibility of confronting 
a changed financial circumstance at the end of the first year. Thus, the financial 
stress for scholarship students at the Competitive Law School will be much 
higher than for scholarship students at the Non-Competitive Law School.
Competitiveness
In choosing to “front-load” scholarships for first-year students, Competitive 
Law Schools are making a choice to foster a much more competitive 
environment—a zero-sum environment—as students compete not only for 
the positive opportunities that come with good grades, but also to avoid the 
negative consequences of losing financial assistance. This is particularly true 
at schools that award scholarships to significantly more first-year students 
than possibly can meet the renewal conditions. Scholarship recipients at the 
Competitive Law School thus have an “extra” reason to be competing with 
their classmates for the highest possible grades. This is likely to exacerbate 
the extent to which the culture takes on an atomistic and competitive aspect.23
By contrast, Non-Competitive Law Schools are making a choice to foster 
a less-competitive law school culture, because students do not have the 
added pressure of competing with their classmates to avoid the negative 
consequences of losing financial assistance. While students at the Non-
Competitive Law School might create an environment in which they engage 
in heated competition with their classmates for the highest grades and the 
opportunities that come with those grades, the non-competitive scholarship 
model does not exacerbate in any way the inherent competitive nature of the 
students who choose to attend the Non-Competitive Law School. Indeed, it is 
possible that the students in the Non-Competitive Law School will be able to 
create something of a more collaborative learning environment partly because 
they are not competing to retain their scholarships.24
scholarship program at all (or simply gave every student the same $6,000 scholarship).
23. See Roger C. Cramton, Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. Legal Educ. 
247, 261 (1978) (quoting Robert Bellah, The New Religious Consciousness and The Secular 
University, Daedelus 111 (Fall 1974)).
24. For example, two law schools with non-competitive scholarship programs, Duke University 
Law School and the University of St. Thomas School of Law, have made a name for 
themselves by promoting a strong sense of community among students, staff and faculty. 
See http://www.law.duke.edu/about/community/index; http://www.stthomas.edu/law/
whychoose/community/default.html. 
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Individual Value and Devaluation
Competitive Law Schools also create an environment in which a significant 
percentage of their students are going to experience a “double-whammy” of 
inadequacy. Not only are they not “measuring up” in terms of getting the types 
of grades to which they were accustomed as an undergraduate (getting Bs and 
Cs instead of As and some Bs), they are now being told they are “unworthy” 
of continued scholarship assistance as a result.25 For the forty-six students 
who do not get their scholarships renewed, the message they receive from the 
Competitive Law School is one of inadequacy and of being devalued. While 
the Competitive Law School initially valued their background, experience, 
undergraduate GPA, and LSAT (or at least their GPA and LSAT) enough to 
provide a scholarship as an incentive to come to the school, when the students 
fail to perform in the top one-third of their class, the Competitive Law School 
essentially says: “We no longer care about your background, experience, 
undergraduate performance and LSAT and the ways they might enrich the 
law school community—we care only that you did not perform in the top 
one-third of your class.” This exacerbates the already extensive emphasis 
25. One of my colleagues described her experience at a Competitive Law School as follows: 
I had so many, many students who came to me in total shock when they lost their 
scholarships. …I heard many bitter and devastated students complaining about “bait 
and switch,” and wanting to file consumer lawsuits against the school…[S]ending 
out so many graduates with such an intensely bitter attitude toward their law school 
[seems] unwise and unlikely to serve the law school well in the long run.
  
Email exchange with Professor Jennifer Wright (email on file with the author.) 
 The research of Ken Sheldon and Larry Krieger indicates that the first-year experience is 
very discouraging to most law students who experience a significant decline in well-being 
during the first year of law school. Lawrence S. Krieger & Kennon M. Sheldon, Does Legal 
Education Have Undermining Effects on Law Students? Evaluating Changes in Motivation, 
Values, and Well-Being, 22 Behav. Sci. & Law 261, 281 (2004). Notably, their research 
suggests that lack of autonomy support plays a significant role in the decline of well-being 
among first-year law students. Id. Autonomy support contemplates a context in which the 
authority figure (law school professors) give subordinates (law students) choices to exercise 
autonomy, explain when choices are not available, and generally manifest an interest in 
and appreciation of the perspective of the subordinates. Kennon M. Sheldon & Lawrence 
S. Krieger, Understanding the Negative Effects of Legal Education on Law Students: A 
Longitudinal Test of Self-Determination Theory, 33 Pers. & Soc. Psych. Bull. 883, 884 
(2007). For those familiar with legal education, particularly in the first year, it should not be 
surprising that first-year law students generally do not perceive much autonomy support. 
They have almost no choice in their subjects of study, little control over the classroom 
experience and frequently are informed that their perspective is not only not valued, but 
is misguided. While there is no specific data on well-being across a comparative sample of 
law schools with competitive scholarship renewal programs as compared to non-competitive 
scholarship renewal programs, it would make sense that students who may anticipate losing 
their scholarship assistance based on first semester grades or first year grades would feel less 
autonomy support and would experience a greater decline in well-being. 
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law students tend to place on grades and extrinsic motivators26 and creates 
a critical mass of unhappy second-year and third-year students who are not 
likely to be generous alumni.27 Students at Non-Competitive Law Schools, 
on the other hand, may still experience one “whammy” of disappointment in 
terms of receiving grades that are not consistent with their past experience, 
along with some self-doubt and diminished confidence in their abilities, but 
these schools do not compound this challenge with a “double whammy” of 
yanking scholarship assistance from a significant percentage of their students. 
Rather, the Non-Competitive Law School communicates to its scholarship 
recipients that it continues to value the contributions they make to the law 
school community, even if their grades are not in the top one-third of the class. 
The Non-Competitive Law School, therefore, has a culture less impacted by an 
exacerbated sense of inadequacy and devaluation than the Competitive Law 
School.28 While the data may not be compelling from a statistical standpoint, 
it is worth noting that there does appear to be some correlation between the 
competitive scholarship model and the competitive environment of the law 
school.29 Conversely, there also appears to be some correlation between the 
non-competitive scholarship model and the quality of life experienced by law 
students.30
26. Lawrence S. Krieger, The Inseparability of Professionalism and Personal Satisfaction: 
Perspectives on Values, Integrity and Happiness, 11 Clin. L. Rev. 425, 433; see Krieger & 
Sheldon, supra note 25, at 281.
27. See supra note 25. The other message Competitive Law Schools are sending is that the critical 
thinking skills and analytical skills emphasized in the first-year of law school (Carnegie’s 
“first apprenticeship”) are more important to being a lawyer than the other practical 
skills and professional values reflected in Carnegie’s “second apprenticeship” and “third 
apprenticeship,” respectively. William S. Sullivan, Anne Colby, Judith Welch Wegner, 
Lloyd Bond & Lee S. Shulman, Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law, 
13–14, 28–32 (Jossey-Bass 2007).
28. By comparison with the Competitive Law Schools, the Non-Competitive Law School also 
is communicating that the “first apprenticeship” is not “more important” to being a lawyer 
than the “second apprenticeship” and “third apprenticeship.” 
29. In the Princeton Review’s Ranking of Most Competitive Law Students in the last four years, 
there were fourteen different law schools that were ranked among the top-ten in one or 
more years, ten of which showed up in multiple years. Nine of those ten school recognized 
as “Most Competitive” in multiple years have competitive scholarship renewal programs 
(Albany, Baylor, BYU, Campbell, Ohio Northern, Roger Williams, St. John’s, St. Thomas 
[FL], Whittier), while only one (Thomas Cooley) employs a non-competitive scholarship 
renewal program. Best 172 Law Schools (2011 Edition); Best 174 Law Schools (2010 Edition); 
Best 174 Law Schools (2009 Edition) and Best 170 Law Schools (2008 Edition).
30. In the Princeton Review’s rankings for Best Quality of Life for law students in the last 
four years, there were sixteen different law schools that were ranked among the top ten in 
one or more years, nine of which showed up in multiple years. Five of those nine schools 
recognized for “Best Quality of Life” in multiple years have non-competitive scholarship 
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Thoughts on Best Practices 
The non-competitive scholarship model is less stressful for students and 
should create a law school environment that is less likely to cause a significant 
decline in the well-being of law students as a result of exacerbated financial 
stress, excessive competition and a sense of devaluation. That said, law schools 
should not be precluded from utilizing a competitive scholarship model or 
whatever scholarship model makes sense for that school. Moreover, schools 
may have legitimate concerns about retaining rising second-year students who 
may have outperformed their objective criteria and now may be considering 
transferring to another school, and may view cannibalization of existing 
scholarships as the most feasible way to accomplish this retention. 
But at the present moment, there is a profound information asymmetry 
between law schools and prospective law students when it comes to 
scholarship offers. At many Competitive Law Schools, the law schools are 
keenly aware of the impact of a forced curve on first-year grades and know that 
they have offered scholarships to significantly more first-year students than can 
possibly renew their scholarships under the renewal conditions attached to the 
scholarships. Prospective law students, by contrast, have generally performed 
very well academically, frequently have not experienced how a forced grading 
curve functions and well may perceive that by being granted a scholarship, 
they are among the “best students” and should be able to remain among the 
“best students” and retain a GPA or class rank that allows them to renew 
their scholarship. They are not aware that the law school has given out more 
scholarships than possibly can be renewed and are not informed by the law 
school of the likelihood of non-renewal.31
Thus, there is a profound need for greater clarity and transparency with 
respect to scholarship awards and renewal rates.32 Law school has become an 
renewal programs (NYU, Oregon, University of St. Thomas [MN], Vanderbilt and 
Virginia), while three have competitive scholarship renewal programs (Chapman, Colorado 
and Northwestern) and one is need-based (Stanford).
31. More specifically, prospective students are not aware, for example, that the law school has 
given out scholarships to 50 percent of the incoming class and that only two-thirds of that 
50 percent will be able to perform in the top-third. Or, for a school with a GPA stipulation, 
the prospective students are not aware that the law school forced curve may make it much 
harder to maintain a 3.0 than the students might think based on their collegiate experience. 
Moreover, as noted in the first sentence, the students are not aware that the 3.0 GPA may 
translate to the top-third or top-half of the class at a school that may have given scholarships 
to 60 percent or 70 percent of the incoming class. 
32. Others have already identified the need for greater clarity and transparency with respect to 
placement and salary statistics. Professor William Henderson agrees that the quality of the 
information supporting placement and salary statistics in U.S. News and National Ass’n 
for Law Placement reports is uncertain. Many schools simply skip reporting short-term 
employment statistics to avoid unfavorable press. Short-term measurements also exclude 
government and public interest lawyers who usually cannot seek employment until after 
passing the bar exam. See Morriss & Henderson, supra note 9, at 798-799; see also Lewis A. 
Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Legal Education and Entry into the Legal Profession: 
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increasingly expensive investment over the last two decades.33 Law students 
increasingly are taking on greater and greater levels of debt to finance their 
education.34 As a result, scholarships play a significant role in the decisions 
many applicants make in deciding among law schools.35 
But how should an applicant compare competing scholarship offers from 
the Non-Competitive Law School and the Competitive Law School? If 
the Non-Competitive Law School offers an applicant a $7,500 scholarship 
conditioned only on the student maintaining good academic standing, how 
should that compare with a scholarship offer of $10,000 from the Competitive 
The Role of Race, Gender, and Educational Debt, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 829, n.58 (1995).
33. The average resident tuition at a public law school has increased 234 percent between 1990 
and 2003. Denis Binder, The Changing Paradigm in Public Legal Education, 8 Loy. J. of 
Pub. Int. L. 1, 10 (2006). The ABA estimates that between 1995 and 2005, private school 
tuition increased 42 percent, in-state public school tuition increased 52 percent, and out-of-
state public school tuition rose 49 percent. Am. Bar Ass’n, Law School Tuition Average and 
Median (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/charts/stats%20-%205.
pdf. At many schools, tuition increased at triple the inflation rate between the 1980s and the 
present. Maimon Schwarzschild, The Ethics and Economics of American Legal Education 
Today, 17 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 3, 3 (2008).
34. The average law student debt doubled between 2002 and 2007. The average private law 
school graduate in 2006 amassed $76,763 in debt; the average public law school graduate 
financed $48,910. John O. Sonsteng, Donna Ward, Colleen Bruce & Michael Petersen, A 
Legal Education Renaissance: A Practical Approach for the Twenty-First Century, 34 Wm. 
Mitchell L. Rev. 303, 359 (2007). According to the Department of Education, 80 percent 
of the students already had an average of $20,000 in debt incurred while obtaining their 
undergraduate degrees. Letter from Karen J. Mathis, President of the American Bar Assn., 
to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Regarding S. 442: The John R. Justice Prosecutors and 
Defenders Incentive Act of 2007, 1–2 (Mar. 5, 2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/
poladv/letters/legaled/2007mar05_loanforgive_l.pdf.
35. See A. Johnson, Jr., The Destruction of the Holistic Approach to Admissions: The Pernicious 
Effects of Rankings, 81 Ind. L.J. 309, 347 n.141 (noting that students view competing 
scholarship offers when considering different law schools to which they have been admitted). 
Consider, as well, websites such as Law School Numbers, http://lawschoolnumbers.com/, 
at which students post information about the schools to which they have applied, whether 
they have been accepted, and whether they have received scholarship offers (including 
commentaries regarding the application process in many cases). The postings at this site 
make it clear that schools compete with scholarships and that students consider scholarships 
(along with ranking/prestige and location among other factors) when making their 
decisions. Between 2004–2005 and 2009–2010, the number of students receiving non-need-
based aid increased from 31,265 to 39,845 (an increase of over 25 percent) with an increase 
in the amount of non-need-based aid from roughly $291 million to roughly $522 million (an 
increase of over 71 percent). Memo from the Section on Legal Education and Admission 
to the Bar to Senator Charles Grassley, July 20, 2011, att. 4, pp 14–15. (Unfortunately, this 
memorandum does not break out the number of students receiving non-need-based aid who 
are first-year students rather than second-year or third-year students. Based on the renewal 
rates referenced supra note 13, my hypothesis is that the growth in those receiving non-need-
based aid is predominantly among first-year students, who may represent close to half of 
those receiving non-need-based aid, with significantly fewer second-year students and third-
year students receiving non-need-based aid.)
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Law School conditioned on the student maintaining a rank in the top one-
third of the class? 
If the applicant does not have meaningful data about the renewal rate of 
scholarship recipients at each school, it is truly challenging to compare the 
awards. Because the student’s history is one in which she always has performed 
in the top one-third of any population of which she has been a part, she is 
likely to over-estimate her likelihood of performing in the top one-third such 
that she can retain her scholarship. This is particularly the case if she is not 
cognizant of how a forced grading curve functions and if she is unaware that 
two-thirds of her classmates also received scholarships and will be competing 
to be in the top-one-third of the class.36 But if each school was required to 
report the number/percentage of students who retained scholarships, then the 
applicant would have a better basis for comparing these two awards (even 
if the applicant remains perhaps unduly optimistic about her likelihood of 
maintaining the scholarship).
For example, if the Non-Competitive Law School has data (which it almost 
certainly does), showing that only two students each year lose scholarships by 
failing to maintain good academic standing, and discloses that information 
on its website, the applicant considering Non-Competitive Law School would 
know that she has a 98 percent chance of retaining her scholarship and can 
calculate its expected value over three years as being close to the full value of a 
three-year stream of payments of $7,500 each year—roughly $22,200.37
Similarly, if the Competitive Law School has data (which it certainly 
should) identifying that 46 percent of scholarship recipients did not have their 
scholarships renewed, and disclosed that information on its website, then the 
applicant should be able to do a discounted calculation that shows that the 
expected value of a $10,000 a year scholarship from the Competitive Law 
36. One of my colleagues noted that this was consistent with her experience at another law 
school. “You’re right—people who have always been at the top of their classes, especially 
who are attending a third-tier law school, don’t even consider the possibility that they may 
have any problem maintaining that level of achievement.” Email exchange with Professor 
Jennifer Wright (on file with the author). 
37. The expected value of three payments of $7,500 over three years, when there is a 98 
percent chance of retaining the payment in years two and three is the sum of $7500+(7500 
x .98) + (7500 x .98) = $7500+$7350+$7350 = $22,200. Because the discounted present value 
calculation would be comparable at both a Competitive Law School and a Non-Competitive 
Law School, I have not engaged in a separate present value calculation as the comparison is 
simpler without it.
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School is projected at roughly $20,800, rather than the roughly $30,000 the 
student might assume it to be worth believing it will be renewed for three years. 
If the applicant has only a 54 percent chance of renewing the scholarship, then 
the expected value for years two and three should be $5,400 each year for a 
total of roughly $20,800.38 While the scholarship offer from the Competitive 
Law School “projects” to be a $30,000 scholarship over three years (assuming 
it is renewed), $7,500 more than the $22,500 projected value of the scholarship 
from the Non-Competitive Law School, if applicants use the true expected 
value, the scholarship at the Competitive Law School is actually worth $1,400 
less than the scholarship from the Non-Competitive Law School ($20,800 
rather than $22,200). This financial difference also does not take into account 
the difference in culture the applicant is likely to find at the Competitive Law 
School as compared with the Non-Competitive Law School.
While students are applauded for being “savvy” about scholarship assistance 
and for their willingness to “play” schools against each other in scholarship 
reconsideration competitions,39 it is not at all clear that students are as savvy as 
they are given credit for being.40 Indeed, postings to the Law School Numbers 
website, for example, frequently reflect a three-year total of scholarship 
assistance (without any discounting or acknowledgement that the scholarship 
is from a school with a competitive scholarship program rather than a non-
competitive scholarship program).41 This suggests that students may not be 
38. Notably, if the renewal rate is more like 45 percent (as reflected supra in note 13), then the 
expected value of the $10,000 a year scholarship drops to more like $19,000.
39. See supra note 35.
40. In a recent blog posting, Professor William Henderson described the average student as 
being slightly naïve. 
The modal student entering law school is not homo economicus. Rather, he or she is young, 
inexperienced, and overly impressed with branding—largely through U.S. News—and 
the opinions of peers. IQ does not shield the young from overconfidence and the 
reflexive desire to impress others through the acquisition of positional goods. Indeed, 
sometimes intelligence in the absence of commonsense can make matters worse. 
 Posting to Legal Profession Blog, September 3, 2009, available at http://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/legal_profession/2009/09/historical-perspective-on-the-bleak-entry-level-
law-market.html.
41. For example, one applicant on Law School Numbers lists two different scholarships as if 
the renewal conditions were both on a non-competitive basis. One $15,000 scholarship is 
listed as being worth $45,000 even though the applicant notes that the scholarship has a 3.2 
renewal GPA. One $20,000 scholarship is listed as being worth $60,000 even though the 
applicant notes that the latter scholarship has a 2.0 renewal GPA (good standing). See http://
lawschoolnumbers.com/jdean30. Another similarly lists one $20,000 scholarship as being 
worth $60,000 even though the applicant notes that the scholarship has a 3.3 renewal GPA, 
while the applicant lists a $10,000 scholarship with a 2.0 renewal GPA (good standing) as 
being worth $30,000. See http://lawschoolnumbers.com/carman1880. Notably, neither lists 
scholarships by discounting to expected value. Moreover, given that there is a big difference 
between renewing based on a GPA of 3.2 or a 3.3 as compared to renewing based on a GPA 
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paying attention to the fine print regarding scholarship renewal conditions or 
may be unduly optimistic about their likelihood of being successful enough 
to renew their scholarships.
Best Practices Recommendations for Disclosure  
of Scholarship Renewal Information 
The ABA, LSAC and Pre-Law Advisors National Council (PLANC) all 
should endorse a best practices approach to scholarship information. That 
approach should contain the information in the following chart:







# Receiving Merit-Based 
Scholarships
100 54 54
Percent of Class Receiv-
ing Receiving Merit-
Based Scholarships
50 percent 27 percent 27 percent
Percent of Merit-Based 
Scholarship Recipients 
Renewed from Previous 
Year





than Half (first-year and 






This data would give each admitted scholarship recipient some meaningful 
basis for assessing the likelihood that any given scholarship will be renewed 
without requiring the disclosure by each school of so much detailed scholarship 
information as to provide competitor schools with an unreasonable competitive 
of 2.0, the listed value of the two scholarships further indicates that the applicants have not 
meaningfully accounted for this difference.
42. This chart presents data for the Competitive Law School. Note that if the school awards 
merit-based scholarships to second-year students who did not receive a merit-based 
scholarship as a first-year, then the number receiving scholarships in column 2 might reflect a 
higher percentage of the second-year class than is reflected in the third row—the percentage of 
merit-based scholarships renewed. In addition, note that the fifth row contains information 
from which prospective students can discern whether there are differential renewal rates 
depending upon the size of the scholarship as a first-year.
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advantage.43 Given the wide array of renewal rates reflected in the handful of 
schools with available data, it should be manifest that prospective law students 
really need this information to make an informed investment decision when 
comparing competing scholarship offers.44 
The Law School Admissions Council (LSAC) policy already requires clear 
and accurate consumer information, particularly as it relates to financial aid.45 
But the policy does not go far enough, as it presently only requires that the 
school, “[i]n the case of renewable or multi-year scholarships,…fully inform 
candidates, at the time the offer is made, of the criteria he or she must satisfy 
to maintain or renew eligibility for the institutional aid.”46 So the policy does 
43. Law School Transparency has developed a similar proposal for addressing scholarship 
retention issues, http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/2011/04/proposing-a-new-
standard-to-require-scholarship-retention-information/. Notably, the U.S. News & World 
Report already distributes some information that would be competitively unhelpful to 
law schools. The U.S. News & World Report Premium Online version contains dollar 
value scholarship information by first-year, second-year, and third-year, listing the 75th 
percentile, median, and 25th percentiles of scholarship support. This information allows 
competitor schools to approximate the discount rate with which each school functions, 
but, unfortunately, fails to provide prospective students meaningful information about the 
likelihood of scholarship renewal because it does not indicate the number of scholarship 
recipients in each class. Thus, it does not provide prospective students the information they 
need to make an informed choice regarding the financial commitment they will be making 
in choosing one law school rather than another. This standardized chart would provide 
students the information they need without relinquishing much more information than 
law schools already release through the U.S. News & World Report database. U.S. News 
& World Report, Best Law Schools Premium Online Edition, available at http://premium.
usnews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools. Similarly, the ABA-LSAC Official 
Guide to ABA-Approved Law Schools has some scholarship information for each school 
comparable to that described above in the U.S. News & World Report Premium Online 
version. ABA-LSAC Official Guide to ABA-Approved Law Schools (2009) (listing the 
number of students receiving scholarships, broken down by full tuition (and more than full 
tuition), half-tuition to full tuition, and less than half-tuition, with no information regarding 
renewal rates).
44. See supra note 13.
45. The LSAC Policy sets forth the following in its list of general principles.
  
   Law schools should strive to achieve and maintain the highest standards of accuracy  
 and candor in the development and publication of print, electronic, and other   
 materials designed to inform or influence applicants. A law school should provide any 
 applicant or potential applicant with information and data that will enable the applicant 
 to assess his or her prospects for successfully…financing his or her education at that  
 school...
 
 LSAC Statement of Good Admission and Financial Aid Practices, General Principle Para. 
3. It similarly provides, in its section on recruitment policies, that law schools provide clear 
and accurate information to pre-law advisors. Id. Admission and Recruitment Para. 4. 
46. Id. Financial Aid Para. 4.
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not presently require schools to disclose the percentage of students who are 
renewed. This language should be revised so that schools also are required to 
“inform candidates of the number and percentage of conditional scholarships 
that are renewed in the second-year and in the third-year.” The chart set forth 
above could be inserted as part of the policy to set forth the expectation of 
LSAC and minimize the extent to which law schools produce information 
with differing formats that make meaningful comparisons more difficult for 
applicants.47 
The American Bar Association (ABA) similarly sets forth an obligation 
upon law schools to disseminate fair and accurate consumer information. “A 
law school shall publish basic consumer information. The information shall 
be published in a fair and accurate manner reflective of actual practice.”48 
Interpretation 509–1(2) specifically references “financial aid.”49 Although 
there is nothing more specific about disclosure of financial aid information, 
Interpretation 509–2 does state that law schools should publish the information 
in “a publication designated by the Council or publish the information in its 
own publication,” noting further that if the school uses its own publication, 
it must publish the basic consumer information “in a manner comparable to 
that used in the Council-designated publication.”50 Thus, if the ABA were to 
adopt a regulation mandating a publication format that included the chart 
above, accredited law schools would need to conform their publications to the 
format used by the ABA.51 Alternatively, the ABA Questionnaire Committee 
could request this information from law schools and at least publish in the 
ABA-LSAC Guide a clearer data set relating to conditional merit scholarships 
that includes renewal rates.52
47. Notably, the LSAC guidelines highlight the importance of applicants providing information 
that is not misleading. Id., Application Procedures Para. 3 (indicating process of investigating 
false or misleading statements by applicants). While the LSAC principles state that law 
schools “should strive to achieve and maintain the highest standards of accuracy and candor 
in the development and publication of print, electronic, and other materials designed to 
inform or influence applicants,” see supra note 45, there is no meaningful sanction provided 
for law schools that are not complying with the highest standards of accuracy and candor.
48. ABA Standard 509, Basic Consumer Information.
49. ABA Standard 509, Interpretation 509–1(2).
50. ABA Standard 509, Interpretation 509–2.
51. The ABA Standards Review Committee is considering a proposal similar to what is presented 
here. Email from Dean David Yellen, Chair of the Standard 509 Subcommittee of the ABA 
Standards Review Committee, July 23, 2011. To view the present iteration of the proposal, 




52. The ABA Questionnaire Committee anticipates taking up whether and how to collect 
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The Association of American Law Schools (AALS) handbook is no more 
precise in its language. Section 6.2.3 provides that “A member school shall 
provide to anyone requesting an application…information concerning the 
school’s grading system, retention rules and procedures,…and financial aid 
programs and policies.”53
To date, the Pre-Law Advisors National Council (PLANC) and the various 
regional associations of pre-law advisors54 have not developed standards 
for assuring that law schools disseminate clear and candid consumer 
information to prospective applicants. Two regional associations of pre-law 
advisors, NAPLA and SAPLA, have collaborated on the publication of the 
NAPLA-SAPLA Book of Law School Lists, but it does not have a consistent 
presentation format regarding scholarship information for law schools that 
would enable applicants to determine whether the law school has a competitive 
or non-competitive renewal model or what their likelihood of renewing their 
scholarship would be.55 Moreover, the NAPLA Pre-Law Guide presently does 
not mention the difference between competitive renewal scholarship programs 
and non-competitive renewal scholarship programs.56 
The PLANC and the regional associations, however, would be well-
positioned to lobby LSAC and the ABA to impose policies and standards 
that assure applicants are provided clear and accurate scholarship renewal 
information consistent with the chart set forth above. Moreover, NAPLA and 
SAPLA could consider requiring that law schools that wish to be included in 
the Book of Law School Lists provide information consistent with the chart 
set forth above.
Conclusion 
While this article suggests that the non-competitive model of scholarship 
renewal provides for a less competitive and more supportive law school 
learning environment, the author recognizes that law schools are not likely 
information on retention of conditional scholarships during the 2011–2012 academic year. 
Conversation with Dean Art Gaudio, Chair of the ABA Questionnaire Committee, July 27, 
2011. The ABA has recently gotten pressure from Congress to address employment statistics 
regarding graduates and scholarship retention issues. See Letter from Senator Barbara Boxer 
to President Stephen N. Zack, http://boxer.senate.gov/en/press/releases/052011.cfm; Letter 
from Senator Charles Grassley to President Stephen N. Zack, see http://grassley.senate.gov/
about/upload/2011-07-11-Grassley-to-ABA.pdf.
53. AALS Bylaw 6–2.3 Recruitment.
54. There are six regional associations of pre-law advisors—the Northeast Association of Pre-
Law Advisors (NAPLA), the Southeast Association of Pre-Law Advisors (SAPLA), the 
Midwest Association of Pre-Law Advisors (MAPLA), the Southwest Association of Pre-Law 
Advisors (SWAPLA), the Pacific Coast Association of Pre-Law Advisors (PCAPLA) and the 
Western Association of Pre-Law Advisors (WAPLA). 
55. NAPLA-SAPLA Book of Law School Lists, 2009–2010.
56. NAPLA Pre-Law Guide (2008), p. 19, available at http://www.napla.org/pre-law%20
resources.htm.
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to reconfigure their scholarship programs, particularly given the pressure 
on law schools from the U.S. News & World Report rankings, which place great 
emphasis on objective criteria such as LSAT score and GPA. In addition, 
some schools may believe a reallocation of scholarship resources is necessary 
to prevent losing transfer students who performed well as first-year students—
out-performing their objective criteria—and may have opportunities to transfer 
if the school does not come up with scholarship money to make it worthwhile 
for them to stay. Moreover, to the extent that schools may have restricted gifts—
donors who provided scholarship resources for which they imposed renewal 
conditions at the time of their gift to the law school—such gifts would make it 
challenging to implement a non-competitive scholarship program. 
Nevertheless, given the significant investment of time and resources 
that students anticipate making when they are considering law schools, 
and given the economic cost-benefit analysis in which students should be 
engaged, law schools have an obligation to provide clearer and more accurate 
scholarship renewal information. This article proposes one specific format 
for the dissemination of scholarship information designed to assure that 
applicants have the information they need to make meaningful comparisons 
of competing scholarship offers. The article also calls upon the LSAC, the 
ABA, the AALS, the PLANC and the regional associations of pre-law advisors 
to work collectively to make sure that the LSAC, the ABA, and the AALS 
implement these recommendations and require more consistent and candid 
disclosure of scholarship information from law schools. 
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Appendix A. Competitive Law Schools
University of Alabama School of Law
Albany Law School of Union University
American University Washington College of Law
Appalachian School of Law
University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bowen School of Law
Atlanta’s John Marshall Law School
Ave Maria School of Law
Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law
Baylor University School of Law
Brigham Young University—J. Reuben Clark Law School
Brooklyn Law School
 University at Buffalo Law School—The State University of New York   
    (SUNY)
University of California, Berkeley,School of Law 
University of California, Davis School of Law (King Hall) 
University of California, Hastings College of Law
University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) School of Law
California Western School of Law
Campbell University, Norman Adrian Wiggins School of Law
Capital University Law School
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law
Chapman University School of Law
Charlotte School of Law
Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology
City University of New York School of Law 
University of Colorado Law School
Creighton University School of Law
University of Dayton School of Law
University of Denver Sturm College of Law
DePaul University College of Law 
University of the District of Columbia—David A. Clarke School of Law 
Drake University Law School
Duquesne University School of Law 
Earle Mack School of Law, Drexel University
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Elon University School of Law
University of Florida, Frederic G. Levin College of Law
Florida International University College of Law 
George Washington University Law School
Golden Gate University School of Law
Gonzaga University School of Law
Hamline University School of Law
Hofstra University School of Law 
University of Houston Law Center
Howard University School of Law
University of Idaho College of Law
Indiana University Maurer School of Law—Bloomington 
Indiana University School of Law—Indianapolis
University of Iowa College of Law
John Marshall Law School 
University of Kansas School of Law
University of Kentucky College of Law
Lewis & Clark Law School
Loyola Law School, Loyola Marymount University 
Loyola University New Orleans College of Law
University of Maine School of Law
The University of Memphis—Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law 
University of Miami School of Law
Michigan State University College of Law
The University of Mississippi School of Law 
Mississippi College School of Law
University of Missouri School of Law 
University of Missouri—Kansas City School of Law
University of Nebraska College of Law
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School of Law
New England Law Boston
University of New Hampshire School of Law 
University of New Mexico School of Law
North Carolina Central University School of Law
University of North Dakota School of Law 
Northern Illinois University College of Law
Northern Kentucky University—Salmon P. Chase College of Law
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Northwestern University School of Law
Ohio Northern University—Claude W. Pettit College of Law
Ohio State University Moritz College of Law
University of Oklahoma College of Law 
Oklahoma City University School of Law 
Pace University School of Law 
Penn State University, The Dickinson School of Law
Pepperdine University School of Law
Phoenix School of Law
University of Pittsburgh School of Law
Quinnipiac University School of Law
Regent University School of Law
University of Richmond School of Law
Roger Williams University School of Law
Rutgers—The State University of New Jersey School of Law—Camden
Rutgers University School of Law—Newark
St. John’s University School of Law
Saint Louis University School of Law
St. Thomas University School of Law (FL)
University of San Diego School of Law
University of San Francisco School of Law
Santa Clara University School of Law
Seattle University School of Law
Seton Hall University School of Law 
SMU Dedman School of Law
South Texas College of Law
Southern Illinois University School of Law
Southern University Law Center
Southwestern Law School 
Stetson University College of Law
Suffolk University Law School
Syracuse University College of Law
Temple University—James E. Beasley School of Law
Texas Wesleyan University School of Law
Thomas Jefferson School of Law
University of Toledo College of Law
Touro College—Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center
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Tulane University Law School
University of Tulsa College of Law
Valparaiso University School of Law
Vermont Law School
Wake Forest University School of Law
Washburn University School of Law
Washington and Lee University School of Law
Wayne State University Law School
Western New England College School of Law
Western State University—College of Law
Whittier Law School
Widener University School of Law 
Willamette University College of Law
William Mitchell College of Law
University of Wyoming College of Law 
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AppendixB. Non-Competitive Law Schools—Merit-Based Awards  
Guaranteed for Three Years or Renewed Based on  
Academic Good Standing
Boston University School of Law
Case Western Reserve University School of Law
University of Cincinnati College of Law
University of Detroit Mercy School of Law 
Duke University School of Law 
Emory University School of Law
Fordham University School of Law 
University of Georgia School of Law
Georgia State University College of Law 
University of Louisville’s Brandeis School of Law
Loyola University Chicago School of Law
Marquette University Law School
University of Maryland School of Law
Mercer University—Walter F. George School of Law
University of Minnesota Law School
New York University School of Law
University of North Carolina School of Law
Northeastern University School of Law
Notre Dame Law School
Nova Southeastern University—Shepard Broad Law Center
University of Oregon School of Law
University of Pennsylvania Law School
University of St. Thomas School of Law—Minneapolis 
Samford University, Cumberland School of Law
University of Southern California, Gould School of Law
University of Tennessee College of Law
Thomas M. Cooley Law School
University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law
Vanderbilt University Law School
University of Virginia School of Law 
Washington University School of Law
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Appendix C. Law Schools with Only Need-Based Awards (Need) or with 
Insufficient Information to Classify Scholarship Program
University of Akron School of Law 
University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law
Arizona State University—Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law
University of Arkansas School of Law (Fayetteville)
University of Baltimore School of Law 
Boston College Law School 
Charleston School of Law
University of Chicago Law School 
Cleveland State University—Cleveland-Marshall College of Law
Columbia University School of Law
University of Connecticut School of Law (Need)
Cornell Law School (Need)
Faulkner University, Thomas Goode Jones School of Law
Florida A&M University College of Law
Florida Coastal School of Law
Florida State University College of Law 
George Mason University School of Law
Georgetown University Law Center (Need)
Harvard Law School (Need)
University of Hawai’i at Manoa—William S. Richardson School of Law 
University of Illinois College of Law
Inter American University School of Law
Liberty University School of Law
Louisiana State University, Paul M. Hebert Law Center
University of Michigan Law School
University of Montana School of Law
New York Law School
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law
University of Puerto Rico School of Law (Need)
St. Mary’s University School of Law
University of South Carolina School of Law
University of South Dakota School of Law 
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Stanford University Law School (Need)
University of Texas School of Law
Texas Southern University—Thurgood Marshall School of Law
Texas Tech University School of Law
Villanova University School of Law 
University of Washington School of Law
West Virginia University College of Law 
William & Mary Law School
University of Wisconsin Law School
Yale Law School (Need)
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